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TRANS MISS ION MECHANISM
ABSTRACT
This paper examines changes over time in the importance of thelending
channel in the transmission of monetary shocks to the realeconomy. We first
use a simple extension of the Bernanke-Blinder model to isolate the observable
factors that affect the strength of the lending channel. We then show that
based on changes in the stnicture of banks assets, reserve requirements, and the
composition of external firm finance, the lending channel should have been
stronger before 1929 than during the post-World War II period, especially the
first half of this period. Finally, we demonstrate that conventional indicators
of the importance of the lending channel, such as the spread between the loan
rate and the bond rate and the correlation between loans and output, do not
show the predicted decline in the importance of lending over time. From this
we conclude that either the traditional indicators are not useful measures of the
strength of the lending channel or that the lending channel has not been
quantitatively important in any era.
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In recent years, macroeconomists have devoted renewed attentionto
understanding the monetary transmission mechanism. According to
the standard "money" view, anopen market sale of bonds by the
central bank forces up interest rates because bond holders must be
compensated with higher interest income for holding a less liquid
combination of assets. Although textbook presentations of this view
often assume that banks are involved in the transmission of theopen
market sale, the presence of banks, and particularly bank loans, is in
no way necessary.
The alternative "lending" view of the monetary transmission mech-
anism assumes that bank loans are a special form of external finance.
Banks do not regard loans and bonds as perfect substitutes on the
asset side of their balance sheets, and firms do not regard bank loans
as equivalent to other sources of funds on the liability side of their
balance sheets. Since banks faced with a loss of reserves prefer to
reduce the interest bearing component of their portfolio partly via
loans and partly via securities, and since firms do not view securities
as perfect substitutes for bank loans, the interest rate on loans must
increase relative to that on securities. This increase in the "spread"
reflects an additional contractionary effect of restrictive monetary
policy that is absent in the pure money view of the transmission
mechanism.
This paper provides historical perspective on the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. Several recent papers attempt to determine
whether the special nature of bank lending impinges on the monetary
transmission mechanism (Bernanke (1983), Caiomiris and Hubbard
(1989), Bordo, Rappaport and Schwartz (1991), Kashyap, Stein and
Wilcox (1993), Romer and Romer (1990), Hall and Thomson (1993)),
and a number of these examine the transmission mechanism inpar-
ticular historical episodes (Calomiris and Hubbard (1989), Bordo,
Rappaport and Schwartz (1991), Bernanke (1983)). None of these
papers, however, explores changes in the nature of the transmission
mechanism over time. In this paper we examine directly the changes2
in financial market institutions over the last one hundredyears, and
we show how these changes can be used to assess the importance of
the lending channel of monetary transmission.
Section 2 presents the basic analytical framework. We use the
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model of the monetary transmission
mechanism to show under what conditions theresponse of the econ-
omy to a monetary contraction should be especially sensitive to the
presence of a lending channel. Each of the conditions we identify can
be examined in the data over long historical periods. We can there-
fore determine whether the lending channelappears to be impor-
tant in periods when theory combined with evidence on the financial
structure suggests it should be important.
Section 3 of the paper examines empirically those features of bank
and firm balance sheets that our theoretical discussionsuggests are
most relevant to the quantitative importance of the lending chan-
nel. In particular we document how factors such as the structure
of reserve requirements and the composition of external firm finance
have changed over time. Our analysis shows that thelending chan-
nel should have played a much greater role in the pre-1929era than
during the post-World War II period, especially the early part of this
period.
In Section 4 we present new evidence on the lending channel
by determining whether measures of the importance of bank lend-
ing behave differently across periods characterized by differences in
those factors that our theoretical discussionsuggests determine the
strength of the lending channel. The measures we consider are the
spread between the interest rate on bank loans and the interest rate
on commercial paper, the ratio of bank loans to other sources of
credit (the "mix"), and the relation between bank loans andoutput
after monetary contractions and in more ordinary times. We find
little evidence that these measures of theimportance of the lending
channel change across time periods in theways implied by changes
in financial structure and institutions.
Section 5 concludes thepaper. The evidence we present can be3
interpreted in at least two ways. On the one hand, it may indicate
that traditional indicators of the importance of the lending channel
are not useful. On the other hand, it may indicate that the lending
channel has not been particularly important in any sample period.
Our analysis does not rule decisively on which of these two explana-
tions is correct. However, since the most obvious indicators of the
lending channel fail to provide consistent evidence of its importance
we believe proponents of this view are likely to have a difficult time
providing a compelling case for its empirical relevance.
2 Framework for Analysis
We begin by laying out a model of the monetary transmission mech-
auism that considers the relative importance of different financing
channels. The model is a modified version of the one presented in
Bernanke and Blinder (1988). We use the model to highlight the role
of various institutional features in determining the importance of the
lending channel.
2.1TheModel
We begin by considering the more familiar model in which loans play
no role. The only assets are money, in, and bonds, 6. Our notation
is that small letters signify quantities, capital letters signify func-
tions, subscripts signify derivatives, and superscripts signify subsets
of quantities (e.g., b is bonds while bb is bonds held by banks). Since
the price level and the inflation rate are held fixed throughout, we
normalize them to 1 and 0, respectively. All variables are therefore
in real terms.
The demand for money depends on output, y, and the bond in-
terest rate, i,
(1) m=D(i,y).
As in the standard IS curve, output depends negatively on the inter-4
estrate,
(2) y=Y(i).
Differentiating (1) and (2) yields
13\ dy_____
dmD1+DYi
Equation (3) shows the effect money on output when only the money
channel is operational.
Theories of the lending channel begin by recognizing the existence
of another asset, loans, 1. The banking sector's balance sheet is then
(4) m=bb+1+r,
wherer is reserves and bb is net holdings of bonds by banks. Note
that we treat time deposits and CDs as bank-issued bonds, which
are subtracted from bank holdings of bonds in calculating bb. All
money is held in the form of deposits, which are liabilities of banks.
Non-bank holdings of nominally denominated assets, w, are given by
(5)
where b is net bond holdings of the non-bank public. Note that
we include both firms and households in the non-bank sector. This
formulation assumes that in the short run the stock of nominally
denominated assets held by the non-bank sector is fixed.
Introducing a third asset requires introducing a second interest
rate. Rather than including the interest rate on loans directly, we
introduce the difference between the loan interest rate and the bond
interest rate, 8, which affects investment demand. Thus (2) becomes
(6) y =
where'<0 and Y5 < 0. The demand for loans by the non-bank
public is
(7) 1 =5
where L5 <0.We discuss the signs of L1 and L below.
Banks hold deposits as liabilities and loans and reserves as assets.
Combining the models of Romer and Romer (1990) and Bernanke
and Blinder (1988), we allow banks to hold bonds as either assets or
liabilities, with time deposits and CDs defined as bank issued bonds.
We define b6 as banks' net holdings of bonds. As discussed by Romer
and Romer, bond issues by banks may or may not require significant
reserve holdings. We assume that if reserve requirements are imposed
on bond issue, then banks will not both hold and issue bonds, except
for small quantities of bonds held for liquidity purposes. Thus the
reserve requirement holds on the net issue of bonds.
We take the fraction of bank deposits held as reserves against
demand deposits to be constant at some level r1 that can be thought
of as required or desired reserves. Reserves against bond issues are
taken to be constant at rate r2. Banks choose the fraction of non-
reserve assets held in the form of loans as a function of the loan-bond
interest differential,
(8) l+1bbA=A(S),
where A5 >0.1 IfA is less than one, banks holds bonds on net. If A
is.greater than one, banks issue bonds on net.




In the case where banks are net issuers of bonds, the supply of loans
10 1-(A(6)(1-ri) -
1+(A()-1)r2
Note that if the reserve requirement on bond issues is zero, then
equations (9) and (10) are the same. Thus in the rest of this section,
we assume that reserves are held on net bond issues and then discuss
the cases where no such reserves are held by setting r2 to zero.6
Equating the supply and demand for loans yields
/ A(6)(1—ri) \
(11) L(5,z,y)=l+(A(5)_l)T2)m.
Equations (1), (6), and (11) determine the levels of y, i, and 5 given
the level of m. Totally differentiating the three equations, the effect
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Thisequation shows the effects of an open market sale that reduces
m and raises either bb or b, holding w constant, when both a lending
channel and a money channel are operational.
2.2 Simplifying Assumptions
We now add further assumptions to simplify expression (12). We
begin with the interest elasticities of the non-bank public's demands
for different assets. Starting from the non-bank sector's holdings
of nominally denominated assets, we have the usual addingup con-
straint
(13)
where BP(.)isthe non-bank public's demand for bonds. Dividing by
the total amount of deposits and re-arranging gives
(14) m im bm
This equation relates the percentage change in deposits inresponse to
an interest rate increase to the percentage changes in loan and bond7
holdings in response to an interest rate increase and to the relative
sizes of the three nominal assets held by the non-bank sector. When
interest rates rise, the non-bank public wants to hold lessmoney. It
can accomplish this by holding more bonds (B' > 0) or fewer loans
(L <0) or both.
To go further, we assume that the percentage changes in the
holdings of the two assets in response to interest rate changes are
equal. Thus, r. pP
(15'l — \1
1 bP





Substituting this expression into equation (12) eliminates one term
in the numerator.
We now turn to the income elasticities of money, loan, and bond
demand. The adding up constraint means that
(17) 0=B+D—L.
The standard assumption is that D is positive, and we add the
assumption that in response to an increase in income, bond and loan
demand adjust by the same percentage, so
LB 18 =
1 bP
We thus derive an expression for the relationship between the income
elasticities of money and loan, demand analogous to (16) above,
(19) =(L (1 + bP) m\1J\ m
Combining (16) and (19) gives
(20) DL =8
which eliminates one term in the denominator of the expression for
dy/dm derived above.2
Incorporating these assumptions about elasticities, the derivative
of output with respect to money becomes
(A5( l-T2\ L5\(Y(b'+l-m'(D1
dy k,1+—1)r2)i)y5)b+l
dm (As(1-T2 Ls'(D+DY1 kl+—1)r2)
(21)
Thisexpression shows the effects of money on output when a lend-
ing channel is operational, assuming our simplifying assumptions are
approximately correct. Several comments about this expression are
in order.
The conditions for a lending channel to be operationalare that
A5 <, L5>—, andY5 <0.If any of these conditions fails to
hold, then (21) collapses to (3). The first of these conditions states
that banks do not regard loans and bonds as perfect substitutes in
their portfolios; the second states that firms do not regard loans and
bonds as perfect substitutes in their portfolios; and the thirdstates
that firms' investment decisions depend on both the loan and bond
interest rates.
The condition for money to have a greater effect onoutput when
the lending channel is operational (i.e., the condition for theexpres-
sion in (21) to exceed the expression in (3)) is that
(22) b'+l—m>O.
Since this term can be positive or negative, the lending channelcan
exacerbate or moderate the money channel's effect onoutput. From
the bank's baiance sheet,
(23) l—m=_bb_r.
So, the condition for the lending channel to exacerbate the effect of
money on output is that
(24) bb+r<b.9
We assume in what follows that this condition is satisfied.
2.3TheDeterminants of dy/dm
Having laid out the basic model, we now consider how observable
features of the institutional and financial structure of theeconomy
are likely to affect the impact of money on output, assuming a lending
channel is operational. Our discussion focusses on two broad areas
the structure of bank balance sheets and the structure of firm finance.
The first factor likely to determine the magnitude of money's
effect on output is the structure of bank assets. Assuming that con-
dition (24) is satisfied, dy/dm is largest when A5[A is small, that
is, when banks do not adjust the fraction of their assets made up of
loans in response to a change in the loan-bond differential. Uider
the assumption that A5 does not vary significantly with A, this would
imply that dy/din is increasing in the fraction of their portfolios that
banks hold in loans.
More generally, the effect of changes in A on As/A depends on the
underlying model of bank portfolio preferences. One case where one
can determine the magnitude of A5/A is when there is a significant
reserve requirement on the issue of bonds by banks and A (the frac-
tion of the banks portfolio made up of loans) is near one. In this case
banks are likely to be at a corner, in which the the marginal cost of
one less loan (the interest rate on holding bonds, which is the oppor-
tunity cost of making loans) could be much less than the marginal
cost of one more loan (that is, the bond interest rate adjusted for
the cost of holding reserves against bond issue). In such acase, the
elasticity of the portfolio share with respect to the loan-bond differ-
ential is likely to be near zero and thus, other factors held constant,
dy/dm should be large.
The second factor affecting the size of dy/dm is the structure of
firm finance. Expression (21) indicates that the fraction of firms'
capital coming from loans relative to bonds likely affects the magni-
tude of the lending channel by changing the semi-elasticity of loan
demand with respect to the loan-bond differential, L5/l. As loans10
increase as a fraction of firm finance, we expect L5/1 to fall, thus
increasing dy/dm.
A third factor in the size of dy/dm is the relative size of the
sensitivities of investment to the bond interest rate and to the loan-
bond differential. Holding Y constant, an increase in ratio ofY5 to
V, raises the value of dy/dm. This ratio will be affected by both the
different fractions of investment being financed at the loan and bond
rates and by the potential for substitution between the two. If, for
example, "small" firms invest using loans while "large" firms invest
using bonds, if there is no substitution between the two sources of
financing, and if the two size firms have the same interest elasticity
of investment, then Y5/Ywilljust equal the fraction of firms that is
small. Differences in the interest elasticities of investment between
large and small firms will affect the ratio of Y5 to Y. If small firms
are more interest sensitive than are large firms, dy/dm will be bigger.
Finally, if firms are able to substitute between loans and bonds in
their financing, this will reduce Y5 and thus reduce dy/dm.
3 Changes in Financial Structure
According to the model presented in Section 2, changes in the finan-
cial structure of theeconomy have important implications for the
importance of the lending channel in the transmission ofmonetary
shocks. Therefore, to see if the importance of thelending channel is
likely to have changed over time in the United States, we examine
evidence on how various aspects of financial structure havechanged
between 1900 and 1988. In particular, we look at structuralchanges
in the balance sheets of banks and firms.
The major finding of this analysis of institutions is that the lend-
ing channel of the monetary transmission mechanism should have
been stronger before 1929 than after1945, particularly in the first
two decades after 1945. We find that importantchanges in financial
structure occurred between the pre-Depression and post-World War
II eras and that, at leastup through 1970, essentially all of these11
changes imply a weakening of the lending channel. After 1970 the
evidence is more complicated, with some changes further weakening
the lending channel and others potentially strengthening it.
3.1Banks
3.1.1Assets
Annual data on bank balance sheets for 1896 to the present are avail-
ablefrom the Federal Reserve. These data reflect a major effort by
the Federal Reserve to adjust the historical statistics for theprewar
era (from the Comptroller of the Currency) to be as consistent as
possible with postwar statistics. This adjustment mainly involves
inflating the data for non-national banks to compensate for under-
reporting by state banks in the period before 1938. In this section
we use the version of the Federal Reserve data corresponding to all
commercial banks.3
Figure 1 shows the ratio of total bank loans less real estate loa.ns
to total interest-bearing bank assets for 1896 to 1988. This ratio
declined slowly over the first three decades of the 20th century, from
72 percent in 1896 to 60 percent in 1929. It then fell dramatically
during the Great Depression and World War II, reaching 17 percent
in 1945. Between 1945 and 1970 it rose steadily, reaching 27 percent
in 1950, 46 percent in 1960, and 53 percent in 1970. Since 1970
non-real estate loans as a fraction of total bank assets have hovered
around 52 percent.
Mirroring this fall over time in the loan ratio is a rise over time
in the fraction of bank assets accounted for by government securi-
ties. Government securities accounted for between 5 and 7 percent
of interest-bearing bank assets during most of the pre-Worid War I
era. After the war this number was higher; in 1929, for example,
government securities accounted for 10 percent of total assets. Dur-
ing World War II banks increased their holdings of U.S. government
securities by a factor of four. This came on top of a threefold increase
between 1929 and 1936. As a result, government securities accounted12
for 73 percent of total interest-bearing assets in 1945. Bank's hold-
ings of government securities then fell steadily in the first two decades
of the postwar era as loans rose. However, as the behavior of the loan
ratio suggests, the fraction of bank assets accounted forby govern-
ment securities never returned its pre-Worid War I level; in 1988
government securities were still 14 percent of total bank assets.
This pattern suggests that loanswere, on average, a substan-
tially larger fraction of total interest-bearing bank assets in thepre-
Depression era than in the post-World War II period. Even at the
postwar peak, the fraction of bank assets accounted for by non-real
estate loans was more than 10 percentage points smaller than the
average fraction in the pre-1929 period. In terms of the model given
in Section 2, holding other factors constant, this changeimplies that
the lending channel was substantially more important before1929
than after 1945.
The implications of the low loan holdings during theperiod 1929-
1944 are harder to determine because the period is short and dom-
inated by the Great Depression. The plummeting of the fractionof
bank assets accounted for by loans between 1929 and 1936 almost
surely reflects the tremendous fall in output, rather thansome in-
stantaneous change in the importance of the lending channel.Thus,
a reasonable view is that the lending channel was as importantduring
the declining phase of the Depressionas it was in the three decades
before 1929. On the other hand, after therecovery was firmly under
way, it seems possible that the continued low loan ratios, including
the additional declines associated with World WarII, imply that the
lending channel was considerably weaker in the late 1930s andearly
1940s than previously. Once banks had switchedso thoroughly out
of loans and into otherassets, a decline in reserves should have had
less effect on bank lending.
3.1.2 Liabilities.
The structure and level ofreserve requirements has changed dramat-
ically over time. Figure 2a shows the ratio of thereserve requirement13
on time deposits to the reserve requirement on demand deposits over
the last century. Figure 2b shows the level of the reserve require-
ment on time deposits. Construction of these figures is somewhat
complicated due to changes in the definition of time deposits and to
the variation in state regulations before the founding of the Federal
Reserve in 1914. For the period before 1917, we analyze reserve re-
quirements for national banks, as set by the National Banking Act
of 1864 and various amendments. These figures are also complicated
by the fact that the definition of deposits was changed substantially
by the Monetary Control Act of 1980.
Under the National Banking Act no distinction was drawn be-
tween time deposits and demand deposits; there was a uniform re-
serve requirement on all deposits. Thus, the ratio of the reserve
requirement on time deposits to that on demand deposits for na-
tional banks was one from 1874 until the founding of the Federal
Reserve. Effective in 1917, the Federal Reserve Act distinguished
between time and demand deposits, setting the ratio of the reserve
requirements on the two at an initial level of roughly one to three.
Though there was some variation in this ratio during the interwar
and early postwar eras, it remained at roughly one to three until
the mid-1960s. The relative size of the requirement on time deposits
was lowered significantly in 1967, and the ratio hovered around 1/6
through the 1970s. After 1980 the ratio rose to 1/4, but this change
is somewhat hard to interpret because of the change in the definition
of deposits.
The change in the ratio of reserve requirements on time and de-
mand deposits in the postwar era is even more dramatic if one con-
siders special time deposits rather than ordinary savings accounts.
An important development of the 1960s was the advent of certificates
of deposit.6 While CDs had roughly the same reserve requirements as
savings deposits in the late 1960s, in the 1970s their reserve require-
ment fell from 3 percent to 1 percent. In 1980, under the Monetary
Control Act, the reserve requirement on CDs over a certain level was
set to zero. As a result of this change, banks in the late 1970s and14
1980s had a way of raising funds that was free of reserve limitations.
The level of the reserve requirement on time deposits follows al-
most the same pattern as the ratio of the reserve requirement on time
deposits to that on demand deposits. Under the National Banking
Act the reserve requirement on time deposits was not only thesame
as that on demand deposits, it was also very high (25%). With the
advent of the Federal Reserve, the reserve requirement on time de-
posits fell dramatically (to 3%). This level rose somewhat during
the Great Depression and the early postwar era (to between 5 and
7.5%), before returning to 3% in 1967. Once again, if special time
deposits are considered rather than savings accounts, changes occur
again in 1975 and 1980 when the reserve requirement on CDs was
lowered and then eliminated.
As mentioned above, the discussion of reserve requirements for
the pre-Worid War I era is complicated by thepresence of state
banks that were subject to individual state reserverequirements.
In the period before World War I there was substantial variation
in state regulations. Before detailing the differences between state
and national bank regulations, it is important to note that national
banks account for a large fraction of total bank assets in theearly
period. National banks accounted for 42% of total bank asssets in
1896 and 43% in 1910. Thus, nearly half of bank deposits in the
prewar era certainly had equal reserve requirements on demand and
time deposits.
A systematic study of state reserve requirement legislationby
Rodkey (1934) indicates that most state banks had similar reserve
requirements on demand and time deposits during the period be-
fore the founding of the Federal Reserve. However,Rodkey lists
eleven states that passed legislation distinguishing between the dif-
ferent types of deposits in the setting of reserverequirements. These
states were (in order of date of legislation) Maine, New Hampshire,
Nebraska, Iowa, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Connecticut,
Vermont, Utah, and Colorado. In most of these states, however, the
ratio of the reserve requirement on time deposits to thaton demand15
deposits was much closer to one than in the post-Federal Reserve
period, and the level of reserve requirements on time deposits was
substantial. For example, in the Pennsylvania statute passed in1907,
the reserve requirement on time deposits was 7.5% and thaton de-
mand deposits was 15%. In the Utah statute passed in1911, the
reserve requirement on time deposits was 10% and that on demand
deposits was 15%.
Those states that had similar reserve requirements on time de-
posits and demand deposits typically set fairly high reserve require-
ments. A study by Welidon (1909) of state regulations in 1909
found that reserve requirements on time and demand deposits in
state banks were usually between 15 and 25%. However Weildon
found that in 1909, 14 states had zero reserve requirements on both
time and demand deposits. Since reserve requirements were becom-
ing more common over time, the number of states with no reserve
requirements was surely much larger in the 1870s and 1880s.
Given that the majority of state banks set equal and high reserve
requirements on time and demand deposits in the pre-Federal Re-
serve era, it is reasonable to conclude that the ratio of the reserve
requirement on time deposits to that on demand deposits fell sub-
stantially between the pre-1914 era and the. interwar and postwar
periods. Furthermore, within the post-World War II period, the ra-
tio fell even more. The level of reserve requirements on time deposits
almost surely showed the same pattern.
To look directly at the importance of time deposits to bank bal-
ance sheets, Figure 3a presents the ratio of time deposits to total
interest-bearing assets of commercial banks.8 The relative size of
time deposits, though small, rose through the pre-Fed period and
continued to rise through the onset of the Depression. The relative
magnitude of time deposits fell during World War II, but then rose
swiftly during the post-War period, with time deposits (including
CDs) becoming the dominant liability of commercial banks in the
1970's and 1980's.
The change in the structure of reserve requirements over time and16
the corresponding rise in the importance of time deposits,suggest
that the lending channel should have been weakened between the
pre-1914 and post-World War II periods. In the pre-Federai Reserve
era, banks had little opportunity to raise funds to counteract a fall
in reserves because all deposits were covered by thesame reserve
requirements. Thus, loans had to contract in response to a fall in
reserves. In contrast, in the 1980s, banks could issue CDs which have
no reserve requirement. As a result, loans no longer needed to fall in
response to a decline in reserves.
Figure 3b plots our summary measure of banks' portfolios, A,
which is the ratio of loans to net interest bearing assets (loansplus
net bond holdings). During the period before the Great Depression,
A remained near one, reflecting the fact that banks' netholdings of
bonds were near zero. During the first part of this period,.when there
were substantial reserve requirements on time deposits, we suspect
that banks were at a corner with respect to the fraction of theirnet
assets made up of loans. More generally, the fact that A was sonear to
one andshowedso little variation suggests that banks were reluctant
to change the composition of their portfolios inresponse, for example,
to a change in the loan-bond differential. In such acase, according
to. the model laid out above, the lending channel will be particularly
potent. Over the postwar period, A rose steadily, reflecting both an
increase in loans on the asset side and an increase in timedeposits
as liabilities. The effect of these changes in A on the importance
of the lending channel in the post-Warera are ambiguous. On the
one hand, the high values of A in the latter half of the period might
suggest that As/A was small and the lending channel important. On
the other hand, the largerange of values over which A varied might
suggest that banks were not reluctant to adjust their portfolios, and
thus that that the lending channel was notimportant.
3.2Firms
According to the model given in Section 2, changes in thecompo-
sition of firm finance and the relative size oflarge and small firms17
over time would cause the importance of the lending channel of mon-
etary transmission to change as well. If firms use fewer loans relative
to other liabilities to finance investment, this should decrease the
importance of the lending channel. This is true because a lowerem-
phasis on loan finance means that firms are less sensitive tochanges
in the loan-bond interest differential. Since small firmsare likely to
be more constrained in their alternatives to bankcredit, a fall in the
proportion of firms that are small implies that the lending channel
is likely to have become less important as well.9
3.2.1AggregateBehavior.
Perhaps the simplest measure of the importance of bank loans in the
financing of firms is the ratio of total bank loans (less real estate
loans) to the capital stock. This measure provides an indication of
whether bank loans grew faster, slower, or at just thesame rate as
the capital which such loans are designed to finance. The dataon
total non-real estate bank loans are taken from the balance sheet for
all commercial banks described above. The capital stock series used
shows the net stock of fixed, nonresidential private capital.'O Since
the loan series is in current dollars, we use the current-cost valuation
capital stock series as well. Because the capital stock series only
starts in 1925, we can only look at the ratio starting at the end of
the pre-Depression era.
Figure 4 shows the ratio of total non-real estate bank loans to the
capital stock. As can be seen, in the late 1920s this ratio was between
26 and 29 percent. During the Depression, the ratio plummeted as
loans fell dramatically. The ratio remained below 20 percent until
1960. During the early 1970s, it reached levels close to the typical
value in the late 1920s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ratio
of loans to the capital stock fell again, to values close to 20percent.
This picture certainly suggests that loans were a more important
source of firm finance at the end of the pre-Depression era than in
the postwar era. However, what happened during the earlyyears of
the 20th century cannot be discerned.18
The fact that bank loans have not grown as rapidly as the capital
stock at an aggregate level since 1925 is important because itpro-
vides a way of gauging the plausibility of the sectoral balance sheets
discussed below. Given the aggregate behavior of loans, it would be
impossible for several important sectors to show a marked increase in
the importance of bank loans unless other sectors show a substantial
decline. At a more fundamental level, the decline in the aggregate
importance of bank loans over time suggests that the lending channel
of monetary transmission is likely to have become less important over
time. If more capital was financed using bank loans in the pre-1929
era than in the postwar era, it is likely that the lending channel was
stronger in the past than today.
3.2.2 Corporations.
More detailed information about the importance of bank lending in
the financing of firms can be found in the sectoral balance sheet of
the nonfinancial corporate sector and the nonfarm, unincorporated
business sector of the U.S. economy. The annual balance sheet data
are constructed by merging the data from Goldsmith, Lipsey, and
Mendelson (1963) for selected years between 1900-1945 with those
from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve for 1945-
1990. The data from Goldsmith et.al.,whilesimilar in concept to
those of the Federal Reserve, differ inmany practical ways from the
modern data. Furthermore, the Flow of Funds data on assets and
liabilities from the Federal Reserve have been revised over time, so
that data from the early postwar era are not strictly comparable to
more recent data. To deal with these problems of comparability, we
make several adjustments to the various series. These adjustments
are described in the data appendix.
The bank loans, n.e.c. entry in the sectoral balance sheet is the
best available measure of total bank loans to corporations. Thereare
surely other bank loans made to corporations, but they are lumped
in with the loans of other financial intermediaries in suchcategories
as mortgages and loans on securities. To gauge the changes in the19
importance of bank loans, wecompare bank loans to the sum of
total liabilities of corporations, less tradedebt and the market value
of corporate equities. Whilegross trade debt is typically included in
total liabilities, it is not alarge net source of finance for thecorporate sector because firms owe most of itto each other. Therefore, we
exclude gross trade debt from totalliabilities. Figure 5 shows the
ratio of bank loans n.e.c to total liabilitiesless trade debt plus equities
for nonfinancial corporations.
This graph shows that the loan ratioof corporations rose over
the course of the pre-Depressionera, from 11 percent in 1900 to 14
percent in 1922. By 1929, however, it had fallen backto 8 percent
because of the explosion in the marketvalue of corporate equities. It
then fell further during theDepression, reaching 6 percent in 1933.
The corporate loan ratio started thepostwar era fairly high, reaching
11 percent in 1947, but thendropped substantially in the 1950s.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the ratio hovered around7 percent.
It then rose in the 1970s, but, with theexception of 1974, it did
not reach its pre-Depression peak value. Basedon this graph, it
appears that the loan ratio for corporations was noticeablyhigher in
the pre-Depression era than in the firsttwo decades of the postwar
era. After 1970, loans have increased inimportance, but they are
still less important than in the first decades ofthe 1900s.
The decreased role of bank loans in thepostwar era has various
sources. One widely cited change incorporate finance between the
pre-WWI era and the interwar andpostwar periods is the expansion
of the commercialpaper market (see, for example, Cargill, 1991,p.
140 and Greef, 1938). However,even though the commercial paper
market expanded significantly,especially after 1960, it is still a very
small fraction of total liabilities.Thus, it is not the main source
of the decreased importance of loans.The more important change
is the expansion ofcorporate equities. Corporate equities increased
much faster between the pre-1929 andpostwar eras than did loans or
total liabilities (less trade debt).Indeed, the ratio of loans to total
liabilities (less trade debt) wasroughly the same in the early 1900s20
and the early postwar era.11 Thus, the main source of the declinein
the importance of bank finance for corporations is theexpansion of
equity finance.
3.2.3UnincorporatedBusinesses.
As described in the data appendix, the balance sheet fornonfarm, un-
incorporated businesses cannot be made consistent over time. How-
ever, the data from Goldsmith, Lipsey, and Mendelson for 1900 to
1945 show some interesting trends. Figure 6 shows the ratio of bank
loans to total liabilities (less trade debt) forunincorporated busi-
nesses before 1945. As with corporate finance, loans becamea much
smaller fraction of total liabilities of unincorporated businessesbe-
ginning in 1929 and this decline continued through the Great De-
pression. The decline in the loans to total liabilities ratiowas also
substantially larger for unincorporated businesses than forcorpora-
tions. The level to which the loan ratio forunincorporated businesses
returned in 1945 is much lower than its pre-Depression levels.While
one would not want to deduce a postwar trend from 1945 alone, there
is certainly no evidence of a rapidpostwar expansion of bank loan
finance for unincorporated businesses.
As mentioned above, the ratio of total bank loansto the capital
stock imposes some constraints on what couldplausibly have hap-
pened to the importance of loans for the unincorporated business
sector over the postwar era. We know that bank loans becameless
important at an aggregate level in financing thecapital stock between
the prewar era and the first two decades of thepostwar era. After
1970, bank loans increased in importance, but loanswere still a less
important form of finance than in the pre-Depressionera. The loan
ratio of corporations shows exactly thesame pattern as the aggregate
ratio. Therefore, unless some other sector showeda great decrease
in the importance of loans, theunincorporated business sector could
not have greatly increased its loan ratioover the postwar era.
The fact that in the postwar era bank loans havebecome a smaller
fraction of total liabilities, certainly forcorporations and probably for21
unincorporated businesses, makes it likely that thelending channel
of the transmission mechanism has weakenedover time. In terms of
our model, if there are more substitutes for bank loans in thepostwar
era than in the pre-1929 era, then the sensitivity of investmentto the
loan-bond spread should have diminished. This inturn implies that
the relative importance of thelending channel should have declined
as well.
The fact that loans have become amore important source of firm
finance over the course of thepostwar era suggests that the relative
importance of the lending channelmay not have been constant be-
tween 1945 and 1990. Indeed, judging just from the facts aboutfirm
finance, it appears quite likely that the lending channel becamemore
important after 1970 than it was in the 1950s and1960s, though not
as important as in the pre-Depression era.
3.2.4 Relative Size of Corporations andUnincorporated
Businesses.
While the classification of particular liabilities forunincorporated
businesses cannot be made consistent overtime, the data for total II-
abilities and equities doappear to be comparable across time periods.
Therefore, it is possible to use this information togauge the relative
size of the corporate and unincorporated sectors.12 Sincecorpora-
tions are typically much larger than unincorporatedbusinesses, this
comparison can give some indication of changes in the distribution
of large and small firms over time. Figure 7graphs the ratio of total
liabilities (less gross trade debt) of unincorporated businessesto the
sum of total liabilities (again, less gross trade debt) of corporations
and corporate equities.
Judging from this measure, the corporate sectorgrew more rapidly
than the unincorporated sector between 1900 and1945; the ratio of
total liabilities of unincorporated businesses to total liabilitiesplus
equities of corporations fell steadily over this period. In the early
postwar era, the ratio hovered at roughly the same level as in 1929.
After 1970, this ratio rose substantially,reflecting the greater growth22
of total liabilities for unincorporated businesses.
If this ratio truly reflects the relative size of thetwo sectors,
and the lending channel is more important thelarger is the bank-
dependent unincorporated sector, then the fall in the ratio between
1900 and 1945 suggests that the lending channel ofmonetary trans.
mission was weakening over this period. It then remainedat its 1929
level during the early postwar era. Thesubsequent rise in the rel-
ative size of the two sectors suggests that thelending channel has
become more important again in the last two decades.
3.3Summary
Taken together, the various changes in the structureof financial in-
stitutions suggest that the lending channel should havedecreased in
importance between the pre-1929 and the post-1945eras. Roth the
structure of bank balance sheets and the structure of firmbalance
sheets suggests that loans were moreimportant before the Great
Depression than after. Within the pre-Depressionera, the differenti-
ation of reserve requirements on time deposits anddemand deposits
and the large decline in the level ofreserve requirements on time
deposits at the time of the founding of the Federal Reservesuggests
that the lending channel should have beenstronger before 1914 than
after.
Within the postwarera, the fact that bank loans have become
a larger fraction of total bank assets and total firm liabilitiesaf-
ter 1970 than in the first two decades of thepostwar era suggests
that the lending channelmay have been increasing in importance.
The relative importance ofunincorporated (and presumably bank-
dependent) businesses also rose in the second half of thepost-World
War II era, again suggestingan increased importance of the lend-
ing channel. However, the ratio of thereserve requirement on time
deposits to that on demand deposits and the level ofreserve require-
ments on time deposits fell in the latepostwar era, and time deposits
and CDs rose to become the dominantliability of commercial banks
over the postwar period. These factors would tendto lessen the23
importance of the lending channel. Thus, while it is clear that the
lending channel should have weakened between the pre-Depression
era and early postwar eras, the relative strength of the lending chan-
nel in the early and late postwar eras is ambiguous.
4 Historical Evidence on the Lending Chan-
nel
In this section we examine the behavior since the late 19th century
of various indicators of the strength of the lending channel. Inpar-
ticular, we look at the spread between the loan and bond rates, the
mix of credit market instruments between loans and commercialpa-
per, and the correlation between output and lending. The analysis of
Section 2 and previous analytical work suggest that these measures
should behave differently after monetary contractions than in more
ordinary times if the lending channel is important. Since the institu-
tional analysis of Section 3 suggests that the strength of the lending
channel should have declined over time, our hypothesis is that the
response of these variables to monetary shocks should have declined
as well. If they have not, this could either be evidence that these
measures of the strength of the lending channel are not very good,
or evidence that the lending channel has not been important in any
era.
Since the response of these variables to monetary contractions
is the measure of the strenght of the lending channel, identifying
monetary contractions is an important step in the analysis. The
monetary contractions that we consider consist of three pre..Federal
Reserve financial panics (1890:8, 1893:5, and 1907:10); four interwar
contractions consisting of Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) three cru-
cial experiments plus the bank holiday (1920:1, 1931:10, 1933:2, and
1937:1); and seven post-Word War II episodes identified by Romer
and Romer (1989, 1992) as anti-inflation interventions by the Fed-
eral Reserve (1947:10, 1955:9, 1968:12, 1974:4, 1978:8, 1979:10, and
1988:12). The extent to which each of these episodes constitutes24
an exogenous monetary contraction has been debated atlength else-
where (Friedman (1989), Schwartz (1989), Hooverand Perez (1992),
Dotsey and Reid (1992)); we do not repeat that discussionhere.
4.1 The Spread
According to the model presented above, one key indicatorof the
strength of the lending channel is 5, the spread between loanrates
and bond rates. Inresponse to a monetary contraction, the spread
should increase as banks contract loans, and thusforce firms to use
bonds as an imperfect, alternatesource of finance. Using the frame-





The factors that imply a largeresponse of the spread to money are a
subset of those that lead toa large value of dy/dm in equation (21)
above. The less willingare banks and firms to substitute between
loans and bonds inresponse to changes in the spread, the larger will
be the effect ofmoney on the spread. Similarly, in the case where
banks are net issuers of bonds, thelarger is the reserve requirement
on CD's and time deposits, the larger will be theeffect of money on
the spread. On the otherhand, the sensitivities of investment to the
bond interest rate and to thespread, which affect the size of dy/dm,
do not affect thesensitivity of the spread to money shocks.
4.1.1 Data
Figure 8 presents a measure of thespread for the period 1890-1991.
The loan rate series is the timeloan rate on six-month time loans
for the period 1890-1918, therate charged on customer loans by
banks in principal cites for theperiod 1919-1927, the rate charged25
on commercial ioans by banks in principal cities for the period 1928-
1939, and the prime interest rate for the period 1947-1991.' The
bond rate series is for six month prime commercialpaper. All data
are quarterly averages of monthly data. The figure indicates that
the spread rose onaverage over the forty years prior to the Great
Depression and that it was generally higher in the second half of the
postwar period than in the first half.
4.1.2 Results
Rather than focus on long term trends in the spread,we instead look
at the behavior of the spread in monetary contractions.Figure 8 also
shows the dates of negative monetary shocksso that we can evalu-
ate the path of the spread following each of the fourteenmonetary
contractions we consider. Given the model presented in Section2,
one should expect the spread to increase following monetary contrac-
tions. Given the evidence presented in Section 3, andassuming that
the magnitude of monetary contractions has beenroughly similar
over time, one should expect relatively large increases in the spread
following pre-1929 monetary contractions and relatively modest in-
creases in the spread following early postwar contractions.14
The data presented in the figure do not bear out theseexpecta-
tions. Note first that, looking across the entiresample, the spread
does not consistently increase followingmonetary contractions. In
nine of fourteen cases, the spread remainsapproximately unchanged
or decreases slightly during the two years following the onset of a con-
traction. In three of the five cases where the spread does increase, the
magnitude of this increase is only about one hundred basis points.
The two episodes that display significant increases in themagnitude
of the spread are dominated by the secondquarter of 1980, when the
Fed imposed credit controls that limited the rate of growth of bank
lending (Schreft (1990), Owens and Schreft (1992)). Averaging over
the entire sample, the spread increases by only 21 basispoints at the
one year horizon and by 39 basis points at the two year horizon.'5
Figure 9 shows the average behavior of the spread in each of four26
subsamples corresponding to different "lending regimes." The first
regime is 1890-1929, the second is 1930-1938, the third is 1947-1970,
and the fourth is 1971-1991. According to the evidencepresented
in Section 3, one ought to expect the most dramaticresponse of the
spread during the pre-1929 period and the least dramatic during the
1947-1970 periods, assuming the magnitude of monetary contractions
is roughly similar across the regimes.
The differences in the response of the spread acrossregimes only
partially bear out this expectation. At the one year horizon, the
spread increases on average by one basis point during the 1890-1929
regime, falls by 25 basis points during the 1947-1970 regime, and
rises by 62 basis points during the 1971-1991 regime.Thus, while
post-World War II changes in the response of the spread tomonetary
contractions are consistent with the evidence presented in Section3,
the difference in the behavior of the spread in thepre-Depression and
post-World War II periods is not.
4.1.3 Changes in the Commercial Paper Market
Given that the spread does not consistently rise aftermonetary con-
tractions in the pre-World War I and interwareras, it is reasonable
ask whether there have been changes in the commercialpaper market
that could make this variable a less reliable indicator of thestrength
of the credit channel before World War II than after. Ourjudgment
is that there have not.
This is not to say that the commercialpaper market has not
changed over time. Most obviously, it hasgrown tremendously.
Much of this growth has been in commercialpaper issued by fi-
nance companies and directly placed, which is not considered in this
paper.16 Nevertheless, the nominal value of dealerplaced commer-
cial paper has increased by a factor ofroughly 230 between December
1919 and December 1991. For comparison, the nominal value of bank
loans has increased by roughly a factor of 95over the same period.
This rapid growth, however, does not imply that theearly commer-
cial paper market was backward.According to Greef (1938), by 189027
the commercialpaper market was national in scope and dominated
by large commercialpaper houses that were efficient and modern.
There have also been somechanges in the type of firms which
issue commercialpaper. In the 19th century, it was often less estab-
lished or well-regarded firms that issuedcommercial paper; firms with
stronger reputations borrowed from banks.'7 Thispattern changed
gradually, and by the end of World War litwas typically large firms
with solid credit ratings that issuedcommercial paper. This is still
the case today. This change in thequality of borrowers in the com-
mercial paper market is the obviousexplanation for the change from
negative to positive values of the spreadover the last century shown
in Figure 8.
It is hard to see how either of thesechanges (the growth of the
commercial paper market or the switch tohigher quality borrowers)
could have caused the spread to fall aftersome monetary contractions
in the early period if the lending channelwere important. The mar-
ket for commercialpaper was certainly large enough and established
enough by 1890 that it could absorb a significant increasein the
supply of commercial paper without extrememovements in interest
rates. Similarly, even if less high quality firmstypically issued com-
mercial paper in the earlieryears than in the interwar or post-World
War II periods, a decline in banklending which made it harder for
all firms to get loans would beexpected to raise the loan rate relative
to the commercial paper rate. Thus, neither of themajor changes in
the commercialpaper market is likely to have made the spread fall
after monetary contractions if thelending channel was important.
One institutional factor that couldaccount for the peculiar be-
havior of the spread after financialpanics is the fact that banks held a
substantial fraction of the stock of commercialpaper in the pre-1929
era. Greef (1938, p. 62) argues that a banking panic whichstrapped
banks for reserves caused their demand forcommercial paper to de-
cline. If this effect were largeenough, it could cause the commercial
paper rate to rise and thus could cause the spread between the loan
rate and the commercialpaper rate to rise less than it otherwise28
might,or conceivably, even to fall. However, it is important to note
that this explanation does not account for thevery large fall in the
spread following the monetary contraction of 1920 because in this
episode there was little or no distress in the financial system.
There are alternative hypotheses that could also explain the fall
in the spread after early monetary contractions. Mostobviously, if
the spread merely indicates default risk, then onemight expect the
spread to fall in the late 1800s and early 1900s because commercial
paper was the more risky asset. This same reasoning could explain
why the spread rises after monetary contractions in the postwarera,
since today commercial paper is the less risky asset. This alterna-
tive, while consistent with the data, is not consistent with the view
that the spread provides an indication of thestrength of the lending
channel in any period since it implies that movements in thespread
are driven significantly by movements in default risk rather than by
movements in the demand for loans relative to bonds.
4.2TheMix
One factor that potentially complicates interpretation ofour results
on the behavior of the spread is the fact that since thereare other
dimensions to a loan beside the interest rate —collateral,for example
—theobserved interest ratemay not be an accurate measure of its
price. Of course, as long as the reported interest rate isone compo-
nent of the price of a loan, the spread should stillvary in the direction
implied by the lending channel if this component of the transmission
mechanism is empirically important. Nevertheless, thisconsidera-
tion implies thepresence of possibly substantial noise in the relation
between monetary contractions and the behavior ofthe spread.
In response to this problem withusing observed spreads, Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox (1993)suggest examining quantity variables as in-
dicators of the strength of thelending channel. In particular, they
note that if both banks and firms regard loans and securitiesas im-
perfect substitutes, a monetary contraction should lower thequantity
of bank loans relative to total credit extended.This implication is29
immune to the criticism that a decline inoutput for any reason will
endogenously tend to induce a decline in bank loans, sinceeven in
the face of declining output the lendinghypothesis implies that mon-
etary contractions induce a substitution by firmsaway from bank
borrowing toward commercial paper issuance.18 Kashyap, Stein and
Wilcox test this implication by examining the ratio of bankloans
to bank loans plus commercialpaper outstanding immediately fol-
lowing four of the Romer and Romer (1989) episodes. They show
that this variable, referred to as the mix, tends to fall afterRomer
dates, consistent with the implications of the lending hypothesis. We
extend this approach to early post-World War II and interwar data.
4.2.1 Data and Specification
The mix variable is calculated by taking the ratio of bank loans
outstanding to the sum of commercial paper and bank loans out-
standing. In calculating the mix we examine quarterlyaverages of
monthly data. Monthly data on the nominal value of commercial
paper outstanding are available from the Federal Reserve starting in
1919.19 Over time, however, there have beenchanges in the defini-
tion and breakdown of the commercialpaper data. To the extent
possible, we use only data on dealer-placed, non-bank-related com-
mercial paper. Dealer-placed financialcompany commercial paper is
included in the total, but most financialcompany paper is directly
placed and therefore excluded. Whenever there are changes in defi-
nition or data collection procedures and a period of overlap isgiven,
we use ratio splices to prevent discrete jumps in the series.20
For the period 1919 to 1991 we use loans data from the asset
statement of Weekly Reporting Member Banks in Leading Cities
collected by the Federal Reserve.21 This seriesreports total loans of
reporting banks every Wednesday of the year. We use the data for
the last Wednesday of the quarter as the quarterly observation.22
Because there are some changes in definition and sampleover time,
we again use ratio splices when there is an obvious break in the series
and an observation of overlap is available.2330
4.2.2Results
Figure 10 displays the mix for the period since 1919. Although we
use slightly different data series in order to enhance comparability
over time, our results for the second half of the postwar period are
quite similar to those presented by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox. Af-
ter the monetary shocks in 1968, 1974, 1978, 1979, and 1988 the
mix declines consistently. One should note that during the period
from about 1965 on the mix displays a general downward trend, but
the declines following the five most recent Romer and Romer dates
appear somewhat faster than implied by the negative trend.
In the early postwar and interwar periods, however, the mix does
not generally behave as predicted by the lending hypothesis. Dur-
ing the 1947 and 1955 contractions the mix remains approximately
constant, and subsequent to the 1931 and 1920 contractions the mix
rises. It does fall slightly although briefly in 1937 and declinesmore
consistently after the bank holiday in 1933.
In light of the information presented in Section 3, the behavior
of the mix is most anomalous in the 1920 episode. According to all
the measures considered there, the lending channel should have been
stronger in the 1920's than during any later period. Yet, during the
one monetary contraction in the 1920's the mix behaves exactly con-
trary to the implications of the lending hypothesis. The behavior of
the mix in 1931 is also difficult to reconcile with the lending view. Al-
though bank loans had declined as a fraction of bank assets by 1931,
most of this decline presumably reflected an endogenousresponse of
lending to the fall in output, rather than a structural change in the
importance of the lending channel.
4.2.3 Changes in the Commercial Paper Market
As with the spread, it is important to consider whether there is
anything peculiar about the commercial paper market that could
explain the dramatic rise of the mix in 1920. First, at a general level,
the argument that the expansion and improvement in thequality31
of commercial paper should not have affected the behavior of the
spread also applies to the mix. The commercial paper market was
large enough and comprised of high enough quality borrowers by the
end of World War I that a monetary contraction which reduced the
ability of firms to borrow from banks should have led to a rise in
commercial paper issued relative to bank loans.
The effect of the establishment of the Federal Reserve on the
commercial paper market is a complicated topic that may be related
to the behavior of the mix in 1920. The Federal Reserve Act of 1914
made commercial paper eligible for rediscount by the Federal Reserve
Banks for their member banks. According to Greef, this "created a
broader and more continuous market for notes handled by dealers and
thus gave them a greater degree of liquidity than they had possessed
at any previous time" (1938, p. 143). This presumably encouraged
the growth of the commercial paper market. At the same time, how-
ever, the Federal Reserve sought to encourage the development of
the bankers' acceptances market by also allowing member banks to
accept bills of exchange for rediscount.24 Both Greef and Macaulay
(1938) argue that this development may have had little effect on the
commercial paper market because acceptances were typically used
for financing transactions very different from those for which com-
mercial paper was used. Greef thinks that changes in firm operating
practices, the boom in the stock market, and the generally unsettled
condition of business in the 1920s were the more important sources
of a decline in the volume of commercial paper issued in the 1920s.
Even if the policies of the Federal Reserve were a factor in the
long-term rise in the mix in the interwar era, it is hard to see how
this could explain the dramatic rise in the mix in 1920. As can be
seen in Figure 9, the rise in the mix in 1920 and 1921 exceeds any
reasonable estimate of the usual trend behavior of this series.
4.3 The Correlation Between Output and Lending
Another test of the strength of the lending channel in different eras
involves examining the correlation between output and lending both32
aftermonetary contractions and in other periods. In any time pe-
riod there is likely to be a positive correlation between lending and
output because lending has a substantial endogenous component: in-
vestment and loans tend to go up when the economy is doing well and
fall when the economy is declining. However, if lending also has an
independent component which declines in monetary contractions and
actually causes a fall in output, the correlation between lending and
output should be even higher than usual soon after monetary con-
tractions, because both the usual endogenous response and the inde-
pendent lending channel will be operating. This reasoning suggests
that the differential in the correlation between output and lending
after monetary contractions and in other times provides information
about the importance of the lending channel. If there is a large dif-
ference between the two correlations, this is evidence that there is
a lending channel to the monetary transmission mechanism. Com-
paring this differential across eras can indicate whether the lending
channel used to be stronger in the past than it is today.
4.3.1Dataand Specification
For these calculations we use quarterly data on lending and indus-
trial production. The lending data that we use for this calculation
come from two sources. For the period 1884 to 1929 we use data
collected by the Comptroller of the Currency. These data show the
quantity of loans held by national banks on particular call dates dur-
ing the year.25 While this series does not show data for the same
dates each year or for every month, there is almost always one call
date in each quarter of the year. When there is more than one call
date in a quarter, we use the later of the two as the observation for
the quarter.26 Furthermore, as discussed above, since national banks
account for nearly half of all bank assets in the pre-1929 era, this
loan series has reasonably broad coverage. For the period 1919 to
1991 we use the loans data from Weekly Reporting Member Banks
discussed in Section 4.2.1.
The industrial production series for 1919-1991 is from the Federal33
Reserve Board. Before 1919 we use a smoothed version of the index
of industrial production compiled by Miron and Romer (1990). This
series is smoothed based on a regression of the Federal Reserve Board
index for 1920-1929 on the Miron-Romer series.27
Since the relationship between lending and output is presumably
more complicated than a simple contemporaneous correlation we use
the following regression to estimate the correlation. We first de-
trend and seasonally adjust both lending and industrial production
by regressing the percentage changes on quarterly dummy variables
and a linear trend and then taking the residuals. We thenregress the
residuals for industrial production on the contemporaneous value and
three lags of the residuals for lending. The R2's of the regressions are
a measure of the explanatory power of lagged and contemporaneous
lending for movements in real output. We run this regression both
for the sample period that includes only the twelve quarters after
monetary contractions and for the sample period that consists of all
other times. We estimate this pair of regressions for different eras,
including our main periods of comparison, 1885-1929 and 1948-1991.
4.3.2 Results
The R2's of these regressions for different eras are given in Table
1. First, because the lending data change between the pre-1914 and
post-1948 period, it is important to compare the results for the period
1919 to 1929 when both lending series exist. As can be seen from
the table, the two lending series give very similar results for the
1920s; the R2's for both regressions are nearly identical using the
two different lending series.
Because data differences do not seem to matter, it is reasonable
to compare the data before 1929 with those after 1948. For the
period 1885-1929, the spread between the R2 for the regression for
the period 12 quarters after monetary contractions and that for all
other times is 0.24. For the period 1948-1991, the spread in R2's is
0.17. These results suggest that there has been little change in the
spread in R2's over time. To the degree that there is any difference,34
the spread in the R2's is slightly larger before 1929 than after 1948.
The results also show that the absolute spread is fairly small in both
eras, on the order of 0.2. To put this spread in perspective, the same
type of regression for money (using data on Ml) yields spreads of
between 0.3 and 0.4 for various sample periods in the postwar era.28
There is some variation in the relationship between the R2's when
one looks at certain shorter sample periods. First, the spread be-
tween the R2 for the regression estimated for the sample period after
monetary contractions and that for all other times is substantially
bigger for the 1920s than for the period before 1914: the spread is
roughly 0.5 for the 1920s and 0.2 for the three decades before 1914.
This finding should be interpreted with caution, however, because
there is only one monetary contraction during the 1920s (1920:1).
Second, within the postwar era, the results are somewhat different
for the two decades before 1970 than for the two decades after. The
spread between the R2's for the two regressions before 1970 is 0.23,
almost identical to that in the pre-1929 era. For the period 1971-
1991, however, the spread is only 0.08.
5 Conclusions
Our goal in this paper has been to use historical data to shed light on
the importance of the lending channel of monetary transmission. We
began by laying out a model in which shocks to the money supply
affect aggregate demand through both the money and lending chan-
nels. We used this model to analyze the effect of structural changes
on the importance of the lending channel. We showed that increasing
the fraction of banks assets made up of loans and raising the reserve
requirement on bank issue of liabilities such as time loans or CDs
increases the importance of the lending channel. Similarly, raising
the fraction of firm finance made up of bank loans or the fraction of
investment done by bank-dependent small firms makes the lending
channel more important.
Armed with the results of this modelling exercise, we then ana-35
lyzed the historical changes in the structure of finance. We found that
several changes in financial structure over the last 100years should
have had major effects on the importance of thelending channel.
The fraction of bank portfolios held in the form of loansdeclined
dramatically during the Depression and World War II eras androse
during the latter half of the post-World War II era to near itspre-
Depression level. Both absolute and relative reserve requirements
on time deposits and CDs fell dramatically with the founding of the
Federal Reserve and fell further in the post-World War IIperiod.
Similarly, the ratio of bank loans to the capital stock fell dramati-
cally with the onset of the Great Depression and did not return to its
pre-1929 level until the second half of the post-World War II era. The
relative importance of unincorporated firms, whichare presumably
more dependent on banks than are orporations, fell over the first
70 years of the twentieth century although itrose in the 1970's and
1980's to levels higher than those experienced before theDepression.
The overall effect of these changes should have beento weaken the
lending channel in the early post-World War II period compared to
the pre-Depression era. The lending channelmay have been stronger
in the second half of the post-World War IIera than in the first half,
but whether it should have been asstrong as the pre-Depression era
is not clear.
We then turned to the data to see if we could find evidence of
the changes in the importance of the lending channelpredicted by
our model given the observed changes in financial structure. The
results of this exercise were striking. The systematic increase in the
interest rate spread between loans and bonds that thelending chan-
nel predicts should follow amonetary contraction does not appear
in the data. The mix, which declined followingmonetary contrac-
tions in the later post-World War II period, fails to doso in the
one pre-Depression contraction for which we have evidence. Finally,
the difference between the R2's of regressions ofoutput on lending
inside and outside of contractionary episodes isno larger in the pre-
Depression period than in the post-World War II period.36
Our failure to find evidence of the systematic changes in there-
sponse of these indicators to monetary contractions predicted by our
model of the lending channel is subject to two interpretations.First
the indicators we examine may simply bepoor measures of the im-
portance of the lending channel. In this case, much of the evidence
in favor of the existence of a strong lending channelpost-war would
have to be questioned. Alternatively, itmay be that changes in the
importance of the lending channel have not been reflected in these
measures because the lending channel itself is very weak. As a re-
sult, most of the movement in these indicators would be due to noise
or random events, not to changes in the specialness of bank loans
over time. Our analysis does not rule decisively on which of these
two explanations is correct. However, both of these interpretations
suggest that the emprical relevance of the lending channel has yet to
be demonstrated.
Since the most obvious indicators of the lending channel fail to
provide consistent evidence of its importance, however, we believe
proponents of this view are likely to have a difficult time providing
a compelling case for its empirical relevance.37
Footnotes
1. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) assume that the desired fraction
of the bank's non-reserve portfolio held in the form of loansis a
function of the rates of interest on loans and bondsseparately. We
believe nothing rests on our simplification.
2. The conditions under which the last term in the denominator
drops out are more general than the assumptions made here. For
example, rather than assuming that private bond holdings and loans
adjust by the same percentage as each other (inresponse to changes
in either i or y), we could assume that the ratio of theirpercentage
adjustments is the same in either case.
3. The data for 1896-1970 are from Historical Statistics, series
X588-X609. Data after 1970 are from the Annual Statistical Digest
of the Federal Reserve for variousyears. For all years we use total
loans excluding interbank loans. Data prior to 1970 are for June 30
or nearest available date; data thereafter are for the last Wednesday
in June.
4. In the preceding discussion we examined total loans less real
estate loans. This measure was motivated by the presumption that
most real estate loans are to households and that the lending channel
works mainly through loans to firms. However, if one includes real
estate loans the results are qualitatively similar. The only difference
is that the loan ratio including real estate loans nearly reachespre-
1929 levels in the 1980's.
5. The data on reserve requirements under the National Banking
Act are from Bordo, Rappaport, and Schwartz (1990,P. 211). The
data for 1917-1980 are from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (1983, pp. 236-237). For the period 1917-1962, we
use the reserve requirements on demand deposits for reserve city
banks and time deposits for all classes of banks. For the period
1966 to 1972 we use the requirements on demand deposits for reserve
city banks with deposits over $5 million and on savings deposits.
For 1972-1980, we use the requirements on net demand deposits for
banks with deposits over $400 million and on savings deposits. After38
1980, we use the requirements on net transactions accounts over $28.9
million and on non-personal time deposits of maturity less than 1 1/2
years.
6. Kaufman (1992, p. 62) states that CDs "were developed in
1961 to provide commercial banks with a means of competing...for
the temporary excess money balances of larger corporations."
7. The data on national and non-national bank assets are from
Historical Statistics, series X635 and X657, respectively.
8. Data on time deposits, which include CDs and savings ac-
counts, are from Historical Statistics (1896-1970), and the Federal
Reserve's Annual Statistical Digest (1971-1990). All data are for the
end of June or the last Wednesday in June.
9. Gertler and Gilchrist (1991) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)
suggest that monetary contractions affect the economy especially by
reducing the availability of bank loans to small firms.
10. These data are described in U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis (1974). We use the most recent version of the data available from
the National Trade Data Bank.
11. The ratio of loans to total liabilities, including gross trade
debt, shows a noticeable fall between the pre-Depression and postwar
eras. This is because trade debt has also expanded rapidly.
12. Total assets would be a more obvious way to compare the
sizes of the two sectors. Unfortunately, the balance sheets only give
total financial assets, which is not a good indicator of relative size.
13. The time loan rate data are from Mankiw, Miron and Weil
(1987,1990). The customer and commercial loan rate data are from
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 19L4-19A1, Table 124, p.463 and
Table 125, p.464. The prime rate data are from DRI.
14. The fact that consistent measures of aggregate output and
unemployment show that recessions were of roughly the same size be-
fore 1929 and after 1945 is one indicator that monetary contractions
were probably not radically different in the two eras.
15. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) report that in both bivari-
ate VAR's and trivariate VAR's that include GNP, Romer dates or39
Itomer dates plus a 1966-credit crunch dummyare statistically sig-
nificant predictors of the interest rate spread considered here.Their
sample period is 1963-1989. The results given abovesuggest that the
Kashyap, Stein Wilcox results are dominated by a few observations
corresponding to the 1980 credit controls.
16. To give a sense of magnitudes, in December1988, total com-
mercial paper outstanding was approximately $455 billionand dealer
placed finance company paper and nonfinancialcompany paper was
$261 billion.
17. See, for example, Macaulay (1938), p.A335.
18. Gertler and Gilchrist (1992) discuss possibleproblems of
interpretation with the Kashyap, Stein Wilcox approach.
19. The data for 1919-1940 are from Banking andMonetary
Statistics, 19Lj-191, Tables 126 and 127,pp. 465-467. The data for
1941-1969 are from Banking and Monetary Statistics,191-1970, Ta-
bles 12.10 and 12.11,pp. 714-718. The data for 1970-1978 are from
the Annual Statistical Digest, 1980, Table 22,pp. 73-74. The data
after 1978 are from yearly issues of the Annual StatisticalDigest.
20. Splices are done in January 1970, August1959, and December
1952.
21. The data for 1919-1941 are from Banking andMonetary
Statistics, 1914-191, Table 48, pp. 132-162. The data for 1942-
1970 are from Banking and Monetary Statistics,19'1-1970, Table
4.1, pp. 256-282. The data after 1970 are from various issues of the
Annual Statistical Digest of the Federal Reserve.
22. We have examined both seasonally adjusted andunadjusted
data. Since the differences between the resultswere extremely small,
we present only the unadjusted results for comparability with Kashyap.
Stein and Wilcox.
23. The two cases where we are able to dosplices are in June
1969 when there was a change in thereporting form and in January
1972 when all of the data back to 1972 were revised to conformto a
new coverage basis started in 1979.
24. Bankers' acceptances are two-namepaper; they are a direct40
liability of the firm issuing them and a contingent liability of the
bank guaranteeing funds at maturity.
25. The data for 1884 to 1918 are given in the 1919 Annual Report
of the Comptroller of the Currency, pp. 276-303. The data for 1919
are from the 1924 Annual Report. The data for 1920 to 1924 are
from the 1927 Annual Report. The data for 1925 to 1932 are from
the 1932 Annual Report. Since the early data lump total loans and
discounts together with overdrafts, we indude overdrafts in the total
when they begin to be reported separately in 1898.
26. After 1924 it is often the case that there is no call date in the
third quarter of the year but instead two observations for the fourth
quarter. For these cases we take the first call date for the fourth
quarter (which is typically in early October) as tbe observation for
the third quarter.
27. See Romer (1992, pp. 32-33) for a full discussion of this
adjustment.
28. The data on Ml for 1919 to 1958 are from Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), Table A-i, Column 7, pp. 709-721. The data for
1959 to 1991 are from the Citibase data bank, July 1992 update.
A ratio splice is used to connect the two series in January 1959.
The usual money-output relationship breaks down after the 1988
monetary contraction: the movements in money are much larger and
further behind the movements in output than after other monetary
contractions. For this reason, the spread in the R2's for money are
small for sample periods that include the post-1987 period but large
for the pre-1986 era.41
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Table 1
R2's from Regressions of Industrial Production on Lending
Sample Period0-12 Quarters after a All other times
Monetary Contraction
Comptroller of the Currency Lending Data
1885:1 1929:4 0.32 0.08
1885:1 1914:4 0.35 0.13
1920:1 1929:4 0.56 0.10
Weekly Reporting Banks Lending Data
1920:1 1929:4 0.59 0.06
1920:1 1940:4 0.65 0.35
1948:1 1991:2 .0.29 0.12
1948:1 1970:4 0.36 0.13









Fig.1RatioofBank Loans to Total Interest-Bearing Batik
Assets, 1896-1988
Note: Real estate loans are excluded from bankloans.
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Fig. 3 Composition of Bank Portfolios, 1896-1988
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to Net Interest—Bearing Assets (Lambda)










Fig.4 RatioofBank Loans to the Capital Stock, 1925-198S
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Fig.5Ratioof Loans to Total Uabilities for Corporations, 1900-
1989
Note: Before 1945 data are only available for starred observations;










Fig.6 Ratio of Loans to Total Liabilities for Unincorporated
Businesses, 1900-1945
Note: Data are only available for starred observations.
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Fig.7 Ratio of Total Liabilities of Unincorporated Businesses to
Total Liabilities of Corporations, 1900-1989
Note: Before 1945 data are only available for starredobservations;
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Fig. 9 Average Response of the Spread to Monetary Contractions
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Fig. 9 (Continued)
Notes: The vertical line denotes the date of a negativemonetary
shock. The average behavior of the spread is calculated for four
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Notes: The mix is calculated as the ratio of bank loans outstanding
to the sum of bank loans and commercial paper outstanding.
Vertical lines denote the dates of negative monetary shocks.58
DATA APPENDIX: Balance Sheet Data for Firms and Households
The basic sources for these data come from three sources: Gold-
smith, Lipsey, and Mendelson (1963), the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (1973), and the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (1990). These sources are referred to
as GLM, FRB 1973, and FRB 1990, respectively, in the following
descriptions. We line up the data from GLM for Nonfinancial Cor-
porations with the FRB series for Corporate, Nonfinancial Business
and the data from GLM on Nonfarm Unincorporated Businesses with
the FRB series on Nonfarm, Noncorporate Business.
The general strategy is to line up particular components of the
balance sheet that are of interest, such as total liabilities, bank loans
not elsewhere classified, and bonds and notes, from the diiTerent
sources and then ratio splice them together. The ratio splices are
necessary because the series do not line up exactly due to slight
changes in concepts and measurement techniques over time. The
data for 1966-1989 are from FRB 1990 and are taken as they are.
The data for 1946-1966 are from FRB 1973 and are ratio spliced to
the modern data in 1966. The data for 1900-1945 are from GLM and
are spliced on in 1945.
Nonfinancial Corporations. The balance sheet data for 1900-1945
are given in GLM, Table III-4b, p. 146. The data for 1945-1966 are
from FRB 1973, pp. 85-87. The data for 1966-1989 are from FRB
1990, pp. 9-10. The GLM data include commercial paper liabilities
in the bonds and notes category, while the FRB reports bonds and
open market paper separately (GLM, p. 10). We combine the two
to be the extension of the GLM series. Trade debt is gross for both
sources. The data for corporate equities for 1900-1945 is from GLM,
Table IV-b-17b, pp. 318-319. The equities data for 1945-1966 are
from FRB 1973, pp. 117-119 and for 1966-1989 are from FRB 1990,
pp. 9-10.
Nonfarm, Unincorporated Businesses. We had hoped to form a
continuous balance sheet for nonfarm, unincorporated businesses as
well as for corporations. However, in 1945, the one year of overlap59
between the two series, bank loans n.e.c. are roughly 9 timeslarger in
the GLM data than in the FRB data. Much of this differenceappears
to be due to how total liabilities are allocatedamong categories.
For this reason, we do not examine the individual elements of the
unincorporated business sector. We do, however, use the data on
total liabilities. The data for 1900-1945 are from GLM, TableIII-2a,
p.128. Data for 1945-1966 are from FRB 1973, pp. 85-87 and for
1966-1989 from FRB 1990, pp. 7-8. Adjustment of the FRB series is
needed because for 1945-1966 the total liabilities series includes net
trade debt, while GLM and the later FRB series includedgross trade
debt (GLM, p. 9). For these years we subtract net trade debt from
total liabilities and add in gross trade debt.